Oxford Analytica
CAMBODIA: Khmer Rouge trial will have limited impact
Thursday, 6 December, 2007
CAMBODIA: Khmer Rouge trial will have limited impact
Thursday, 6 December, 2007
EVENT: A UN-backed tribunal on December 3 rejected a bail application by
former Khmer Rouge leader, Kaing Guek Eav.
former Khmer Rouge leader, Kaing Guek Eav.
SIGNIFICANCE: The notorious former extermination centre director, also known
as "Duch", was detained in July after a special court started to function
following years of protracted negotiations on its remit and funding. The
court has been convened at great diplomatic and financial cost, but there
are questions about its purpose and capacity, and fears that it will
generate political tension.
ANALYSIS: The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) was
inaugurated in July 2006 to try senior Khmer Rouge leaders (see CAMBODIA:
Khmer Rouge trials pose political risk - July 25, 2006). It took over a
decade to convene the court, and new problems emerged soon after its
inauguration:
a.. Cambodian and international judges disagreed over the integration of
Cambodian and international law, which at one stage led some international
judges to consider resigning.
b.. The Cambodian Bar Association, led by Ky Tech, a close associate of
Prime Minister Hun Sen and the ruling Cambodian People's Party (CPP),
objected to foreign lawyers appearing for the defence, unless they paid high
fees to the association.
c.. The ECCC itself faced allegations of corruption among its staff, and
suggestions that employees of the tribunal, including judges, had paid fees
to be appointed.
as "Duch", was detained in July after a special court started to function
following years of protracted negotiations on its remit and funding. The
court has been convened at great diplomatic and financial cost, but there
are questions about its purpose and capacity, and fears that it will
generate political tension.
ANALYSIS: The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) was
inaugurated in July 2006 to try senior Khmer Rouge leaders (see CAMBODIA:
Khmer Rouge trials pose political risk - July 25, 2006). It took over a
decade to convene the court, and new problems emerged soon after its
inauguration:
a.. Cambodian and international judges disagreed over the integration of
Cambodian and international law, which at one stage led some international
judges to consider resigning.
b.. The Cambodian Bar Association, led by Ky Tech, a close associate of
Prime Minister Hun Sen and the ruling Cambodian People's Party (CPP),
objected to foreign lawyers appearing for the defence, unless they paid high
fees to the association.
c.. The ECCC itself faced allegations of corruption among its staff, and
suggestions that employees of the tribunal, including judges, had paid fees
to be appointed.
Agreement on use of foreign lawyers and jurisdiction issues was reached in
May, and the Bar Association withdrew its demand for fees. How the other
points of disagreement were resolved has not been made public, but it is
likely that the government became wary about the effect on its image should
arguments continue.
Kaing Guek Eav, better known as "Duch", the former director of S-21, the
Tuol Sleng extermination centre, was placed under ECCC jurisdiction in July.
Subsequently, four more senior Khmer Rouge figures were arrested, all
charged with crimes against humanity. They are:
a.. Khieu Samphan, formerly Khmer Rouge head of state;
b.. "Brother number two", Nuon Chea, formerly chief ideologue;
c.. Former Foreign Minister Ieng Sary; and
d.. Ieng Thirith, formerly minister for social affairs (and wife of Ieng
Sary).
May, and the Bar Association withdrew its demand for fees. How the other
points of disagreement were resolved has not been made public, but it is
likely that the government became wary about the effect on its image should
arguments continue.
Kaing Guek Eav, better known as "Duch", the former director of S-21, the
Tuol Sleng extermination centre, was placed under ECCC jurisdiction in July.
Subsequently, four more senior Khmer Rouge figures were arrested, all
charged with crimes against humanity. They are:
a.. Khieu Samphan, formerly Khmer Rouge head of state;
b.. "Brother number two", Nuon Chea, formerly chief ideologue;
c.. Former Foreign Minister Ieng Sary; and
d.. Ieng Thirith, formerly minister for social affairs (and wife of Ieng
Sary).
With trials due to get under way next year, it seems unlikely that further
defendants will be brought before the tribunal, despite indications from the
court that as many as ten individuals might be prosecuted. The government
has suggested that it is not planning to pursue other individuals.
Government strategy. Despite protestations to the contrary, Hun Sen's
government has shown little enthusiasm for the tribunal. It has accepted it,
with some reluctance, in response to international pressure. The prime
minister probably hoped that the ageing leaders -- all except Duch are now
in their late 70s or early 80s -- would die before the tribunal determined
their fate.
Hun Sen himself occupied positions in the Khmer Rouge regime before
defecting to Vietnam while Pol Pot was in power. Several members of his
administration also served in the regime. The prime minister has repeatedly
urged his compatriots to bury the past, and barred serious study of the
Khmer Rouge era. The fact that there appears to be no disagreements within
the government on the tribunal reflects his strong grip over policy (see
CAMBODIA: Hun Sen in charge as Ranariddh retreats - November 21, 2006).
Trial attitudes. Opinion polling indicates that the Cambodian population at
large understands poorly the tribunal process. However, strong opinions have
been expressed for and against the trials, and interest is apparent from the
large numbers wanting to attend the hearings:
a.. Supporters. Among those who approve of the tribunal are older people
who support the CPP and have benefited from its rule. However, they are
unhappy about international criticism of the government's past behaviour,
and resent the UN role in the court and presence of foreign judges. They do
not seem concerned that the tribunal will try only a limited number of
people.
b.. Justice. Other supporters tend not to back the CPP but believe that,
despite its shortcomings, the tribunal is necessary to establish the truth
of what happened during the Pol Pot regime and to ensure that its surviving
senior leaders are made accountable. This is broadly the view of domestic
non-governmental organisations (NGOs).
c.. Critics. Critics of the tribunal process include those who question
the government's motives and doubt the commitment of the CPP to do more than
oversee the prosecution of a small number of Khmer Rouge individuals. They
are concerned that once the ageing leaders are convicted, the guilt and
responsibility of others will be swept under the carpet.
d.. Age divide. Generational differences have a marked impact on
attitudes to the tribunal. Among the 50% of the population who are under 18
and who have no direct memory of the Khmer Rouge years, opinions are
complex. Many simply do not believe that Cambodians could have been
responsible for deaths that occurred under Pol Pot. Others blame foreigners
for what happened. Still others accept that there were many deaths,
including through executions, but doubt that the ECCC will achieve much.
Unrest risk? Given the restraints that Hun Sen has imposed on its
operations, there is little evidence to suggest that the tribunal will lead
to popular unrest. It is likely to carry out its tasks over the next two or
three years with a minimum of domestic opposition. For example:
a.. most domestic NGOs are generally supportive of the process; and
b.. there is no indication that politicians, such as Sam Rainsy, will
seek to make the tribunal and its procedures a point of difference with the
government -- reflecting the weakness of the political opposition.
This will remain the case despite the critical views of foreign observers,defendants will be brought before the tribunal, despite indications from the
court that as many as ten individuals might be prosecuted. The government
has suggested that it is not planning to pursue other individuals.
Government strategy. Despite protestations to the contrary, Hun Sen's
government has shown little enthusiasm for the tribunal. It has accepted it,
with some reluctance, in response to international pressure. The prime
minister probably hoped that the ageing leaders -- all except Duch are now
in their late 70s or early 80s -- would die before the tribunal determined
their fate.
Hun Sen himself occupied positions in the Khmer Rouge regime before
defecting to Vietnam while Pol Pot was in power. Several members of his
administration also served in the regime. The prime minister has repeatedly
urged his compatriots to bury the past, and barred serious study of the
Khmer Rouge era. The fact that there appears to be no disagreements within
the government on the tribunal reflects his strong grip over policy (see
CAMBODIA: Hun Sen in charge as Ranariddh retreats - November 21, 2006).
Trial attitudes. Opinion polling indicates that the Cambodian population at
large understands poorly the tribunal process. However, strong opinions have
been expressed for and against the trials, and interest is apparent from the
large numbers wanting to attend the hearings:
a.. Supporters. Among those who approve of the tribunal are older people
who support the CPP and have benefited from its rule. However, they are
unhappy about international criticism of the government's past behaviour,
and resent the UN role in the court and presence of foreign judges. They do
not seem concerned that the tribunal will try only a limited number of
people.
b.. Justice. Other supporters tend not to back the CPP but believe that,
despite its shortcomings, the tribunal is necessary to establish the truth
of what happened during the Pol Pot regime and to ensure that its surviving
senior leaders are made accountable. This is broadly the view of domestic
non-governmental organisations (NGOs).
c.. Critics. Critics of the tribunal process include those who question
the government's motives and doubt the commitment of the CPP to do more than
oversee the prosecution of a small number of Khmer Rouge individuals. They
are concerned that once the ageing leaders are convicted, the guilt and
responsibility of others will be swept under the carpet.
d.. Age divide. Generational differences have a marked impact on
attitudes to the tribunal. Among the 50% of the population who are under 18
and who have no direct memory of the Khmer Rouge years, opinions are
complex. Many simply do not believe that Cambodians could have been
responsible for deaths that occurred under Pol Pot. Others blame foreigners
for what happened. Still others accept that there were many deaths,
including through executions, but doubt that the ECCC will achieve much.
Unrest risk? Given the restraints that Hun Sen has imposed on its
operations, there is little evidence to suggest that the tribunal will lead
to popular unrest. It is likely to carry out its tasks over the next two or
three years with a minimum of domestic opposition. For example:
a.. most domestic NGOs are generally supportive of the process; and
b.. there is no indication that politicians, such as Sam Rainsy, will
seek to make the tribunal and its procedures a point of difference with the
government -- reflecting the weakness of the political opposition.
and probable defence counsel attempts to draw out proceedings or implicate
current politicians.
Hitting hurdles. However, the tribunal faces other obstacles. Principal
defence counsel, Rupert Skilbeck, has warned of further delays due to
unresolved legal, administrative and practical matters. He may well have in
mind issues such as the appearance of 'celebrity lawyers' such as Jacques
Verges, acting for the defence.
Funding is also problematic, with the current budget due to run out next
year. While further funds are likely to be forthcoming, there is limited
interest in the tribunal overseas. The current budget is 56.3 million
dollars, though it was still 7.5 million dollars short of this target in
October. Funding, through the UN, has come from donors, with Japan by far
the largest contributor, with 21.6 million dollars. Other donations are
small -- for example, Australia donated 3 million dollars.
It is unclear whether Cambodia itself has contributed any more than the 1.5
million dollars it promised initially to provide. Cambodian Foreign Minister
Hor Namhong is actively seeking additional funding to enable the tribunal to
function until 2010, a year longer than provided for under the current
budget. Having allowed it to come into existence, the government appears
keen for the tribunal to reach a conclusion, in the belief that it can
weather any turbulence it generates.
CONCLUSION: The government has largely achieved its goal of establishing a
tribunal that will try only a limited number of Khmer Rouge leaders, while
failing to address the presence in the administration of many who were
formerly associated with the organisation. Many Cambodians will remain
dissatisfied with the tribunal, but among the young, there is a sense that
its proceedings have little relevance to their lives. Keywords: AP,
Cambodia, international relations, politics, foreign policy, government,
human rights, judicial, opposition, party
Word Count (approx): 1220
Articles referenced
No comments:
Post a Comment